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The relations among children’s moral reasoning, emotion regulation, executive 
planning abilities, quality of the mother-child relationship, and cognitive support and 
stimulation provided by parents, were examined in 87 10-year-old children. Theoretically 
driven hypotheses regarding the mediational pathways among these variables were tested 
in several comparative path analytic models. A mediational model wherein parental 
characteristics were indirectly related to moral reasoning via child characteristics was 
found to fit the data best.  
Specifically, children’s executive functioning was directly and positively related 
to moral reasoning. The quality of the mother-child relationship was positively related to 
children’s emotion regulation and marginally, positively related to moral reasoning via 
children’s emotion regulation. Findings from these mediational analyses and their 
implications are discussed in detail. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The study of the development of moral reasoning in childhood is the study of how 
children first learn moral directives, interpret them, and internalize them as well as how 
moral directives can be co-constructed and reconstructed as children’s emotional and 
cognitive abilities mature. It is the study of how children come to understand right and 
wrong and the reasoning that motivates action to address issues of right and wrong. 
Moral reasoning can be an important factor in defining how individuals assess a social 
situation, view their duties to act in a situation, and react to the needs of others and has 
been associated with compassionate responding (e.g., Eisenberg & Shell, 1986). Both 
structural-developmental (stage) theories of moral reasoning and socialization theories of 
moral reasoning have made important contributions to the current state of inquiry in this 
area. Empirical work has found evidence that both maturational and socializing 
influences are important to the development of moral reasoning. The most recent studies 
of prosocial moral reasoning, defined as the reasoning about situations in which one’s 
desires or needs are in conflict with another’s in the absence of formal rules or guidelines 
(Carlo, Eisenberg, & Knight, 1992), make it clear that while there are no invariant 
developmental stages to moral reasoning there are developmental trends and these trends 
are related to socialization, especially socialization from parents (Eisenberg, Lennon, & 
Roth, 1983).  
 
 1 
This section traces the recent history of theory in moral reasoning and links it to 
supporting research while addressing how these theories view the relation between moral 
reasoning and prosocial behavior. It begins with the classic structural-developmental 
approaches of Piaget and then Kohlberg and Gilligan as well as Eisenberg’s 
reformulation of the structural-developmental approach. It then addresses influential 
socialization approaches that include theories from Bandura, Vygotsky, and Hoffman and 
ends with a summary of both structural-developmental and socialization approaches and 
the work of theorists who have made efforts to blend the two views. 
Structural-Developmental Approaches 
Piaget’s Approach 
 Piaget’s (1965) theorizing on moral reasoning is highly consistent with his genetic 
epistemology, namely that children’s, indeed everyone’s, moral reasoning is a constantly 
shifting system that is always adapting to assimilate and accommodate new knowledge 
and thoughts but that this system is limited by its maturational constraints. The illogical 
thinking in the preoperational stage also characterizes Piaget’s (1965) heteronomous 
stage of moral development. Very young children do not have the cognitive abilities 
necessary to take in the multiple aspects of moral situations and so tend to concentrate on 
one prominent aspect of a moral dilemma. Additionally, moral reasoning in very young 
children tends to be egocentric because children lack the cognitive abilities necessary to 
take others’ perspectives in any great detail. Because of limitations in cognitive ability, 
children must rely heavily on environmental and parental factors to help them assimilate 
the generalities of right and wrong. In heteronomous morality parents are the 
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unquestioned sources of moral teaching and children, when asked to reason on their own, 
apply previous general ideas of morality universally (Jose, 1991), meaning that during 
this stage of moral development children do not use their own reasoning skills to choose 
their moral responses but apply the teachings given to them by their parents. For young 
children, prosocial behavior, especially prosocial behavior that involves cost to the self 
(e.g., sharing a toy), is enacted because it is required by authority. 
 With cognitive maturation children are better able to take others’ perspectives, 
assimilate and accommodate information into their own moral system, and co-construct 
moral rules through peer interactions. In this stage of moral development there is the 
recognition that moral rules are not immutable; they can be questioned and negotiated 
through internal or social discourse. Prosocial behavior is driven by the ability to 
understand others’ situations through perspective taking and the knowledge that morality 
is increasingly defined by both the self and the social group; failing in a moral obligation 
is also a failure to the self and the group.  
 Much of Piaget’s (1965) theory of moral development has received empirical 
support. Young children do seem to have a belief in immanent justice (Jose, 1991), but 
moral reasoning involving children’s independent assessments of right and wrong in 
situations develops along with advances in perspective taking and the cognitive advances 
associated with biological maturation (DeRemer & Gruen, 1979). If Piaget’s theory has a 
shortcoming, it is in underestimating the age at which children have the cognitive abilities 
to decide for themselves what is moral action (Smetana, 1981) and in underestimating the 
importance of emotion in promoting moral action. 
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Kohlberg and Gilligan 
 Though he drew heavily upon the work of Piaget, Kohlberg’s (1981) theory of 
moral development more strictly divides development into stages and more clearly 
defines their characteristics and criteria. The first stage of preconventional morality is 
characterized by fear of authority and punishment and magical-type beliefs (immanent 
justice) for governing moral reasoning and prosocial behavior is enacted because not to 
enact it could result in punishment. Similarly, at the second stage of preconventional 
morality children’s reasoning and prosocial behavior are driven by the desire to obtain 
rewards. In conventional morality individuals’ reasoning and prosocial behavior are still 
driven by rewards but those rewards are less materialistic; individuals are rewarded by 
knowing that they have earned the respect or admiration of others for doing good works 
and that they are obeying the moral decrees of society. In postconventional morality 
individuals understand that the decrees of society are socially constructed and alterable 
but they enact prosocial behavior because they respect the implicit social contract. In the 
final stage of postconventional morality individuals understand that laws and even 
society itself are designed to uphold universal principles of ethics; when an aspect of a 
rule violates those ethical principles the individual is no longer bound to uphold the rule. 
Although the stages of moral reasoning are more clearly defined than they were in the 
work of Piaget, the invariance and non-regressive nature of Kohlberg’s stage theory has 
been called into question (see Lapsley, 2006). 
 Gilligan (1977; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988) has also criticized Kohlberg’s work 
as being biased towards the moral orientations of males while ignoring the moral 
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orientation of females. Gilligan’s argument is that, generally speaking, males have a more 
justice-based orientation to morality whereas females have a more care-based orientation 
to morality that is concerned with the social relationships that define the subtleties of 
moral dilemmas. Contrary to this prediction, however, a meta-analysis on gender 
differences in justice and care moral orientations revealed significant but very small 
effects; between 1 and 2.5% of the variance in care and justice orientations are explained 
by gender (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000; see also Walker, 2006 for further review).  
Eisenberg 
 Eisenberg’s approach to the development of moral reasoning is based very loosely 
on the work of both Piaget and Kohlberg and is currently one of the most influential 
approaches to the study of the development of moral reasoning. It is based on Piaget’s 
and Kohlberg’s work in the sense that it evaluates levels of moral reasoning using basic 
assumptions about the maturation of cognitive development and the limitations they place 
on reasoning ability. Eisenberg’s approach is notably age-developmental - rather than a 
strict hierarchy of invariant stages, she proposes levels of reasoning in order of 
complexity and openly accepts that regression from one level to another may happen. 
Additionally, multiple types of moral reasoning may be used at the same time in 
evaluating the same situation. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that while hedonistic, 
self-focused moral reasoning decreases from middle childhood until adolescence, during 
adolescence hedonistic reasoning increases somewhat until adulthood (Eisenberg, Miller, 
Shell, McNalley, & Shea, 1991). To compensate for this rising self-focus during 
adolescence, other forms of more advanced moral reasoning rise during this period as 
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well (Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, & Van Court, 1995; Eisenberg, Lennon, & Roth, 1983; 
Eisenberg et al., 1991; Eisenberg-Berg & Roth, 1980). Overall, the typical picture of the 
development of moral reasoning is one in which, for young children, self-focused 
reasoning dominates and other-focused reasoning is gradually increasing over time. For 
children in middle childhood, other-focused reasoning is steadily increasing while self-
focused reasoning decreases. In adolescence, self-focused reasoning increases while 
other-focused reasoning is also increasing. In assessing the practical relevance for 
understanding the development of moral reasoning, considerable evidence has been 
found to support the theory that prosocial moral reasoning is related to prosocial behavior 
across a wide range of developmental periods, from childhood through early adulthood 
(Carlo, Koller, Eisenberg, Da Silva, & Frohlich, 1996; Jansens & Dekovic, 1997; Miller, 
Eisenberg, Fabes, & Shell, 1996).  
Socialization Approaches 
 Hoffman (2000), Bandura (1998), and Vygotsky (1997/1926; see Turner & 
Berkowitz, 2005, for a review) present the most clearly relevant socialization approaches 
to understanding children’s moral development, although they differ in their emphases on 
which mechanisms of socialization influence moral reasoning most heavily. Bandura 
(1998) has emphasized the roles of modeling and learning through vicarious experience 
(e.g., observing others in morally-related social interactions and the outcomes). Notably, 
he proposed that observational learning could lead to the internalization of moral 
reasoning above previous levels of reasoning not through simple mimicry but through 
observing the reasoning used by others, learning from it, and then putting it to use in their 
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own moral situations. Some evidence supporting this idea can be seen in Bandura and 
MacDonald’s (1963) research; boys who observed a model using moral reasoning higher 
or lower than their own used moral reasoning similar to the model’s on subsequent trials. 
In a social cognitive approach, moral reasoning is first observed and learned and then 
applied to one’s own situations and internalized; it is through learning and internalization 
that moral reasoning can then be applied to motivate prosocial behavior.  
 Hoffman (2000) and Vygotsky (1997/1926) have emphasized the importance of 
teaching morality. Both theorists have emphasized the importance of having competent 
others such as parents and older siblings explaining and scaffolding moral development at 
an appropriate level. Vygotsky in particular has emphasized the role of scaffolding the 
cognitive and emotional abilities underlying moral reasoning. Scaffolding is a broad 
term, but in the context of scaffolding moral reasoning it can be viewed as the support 
that parents and others give to children that help them to develop the abilities necessary 
to reason independently, plan actions, and develop strategies to regulate the emotions 
associated with interpersonal interactions that may involve conflicts of interest. 
Hoffman has especially emphasized the role of emotional inductions. Emotional 
induction is a strategy that Hoffman theorized as being an important catalyst in the 
internalization of morals. Emotional inductions involve parents using emotion-laden 
speech and discussion to arouse children’s emotions to prime them to learn a lesson in 
moral reasoning, usually about taking another’s perspective. In the early years parents 
and other environmental socializers are the source of moral reasoning and prosocial 
behavior. After induction after induction, moral reasoning becomes internalized to the 
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child. Moral reasoning can then motivate prosocial behavior from within the child and 
failure to act morally results in guilt (a negative reinforcement to act prosocially in the 
future). Some support has been shown for this theory; in a summary of empirical work 
Hoffman (1970) found that both inductions and parental warmth were related to the 
internalization of morality but power assertive parenting techniques were not. It seems 
likely that a combination of both parental warmth and inductions would be most effective 
for parents’ teaching of moral reasoning.  
Summary 
 As with most theories, each position (structural-developmental and socialization) 
is stated such that a literal interpretation of the theories puts them in opposition to each 
other. I think it likely that the theorists themselves would agree that although the 
development of children’s moral reasoning is to a degree socialized through modeling, 
vicarious experience, and the teachings and inductions of parents, it is also created 
through children’s co-construction of moral beliefs with peers and through internal 
systems of accommodation and assimilation. Indeed, it can be seen that there are degrees 
of overlap in the approaches. For example, Hoffman’s theory presupposes that inductions 
from parents will promote the development of a moral reasoning system within children. 
Perhaps it is best to take the middle ground and acknowledge that both structural-
developmental and socialization approaches have merit and contribute to an 
understanding of the development of moral reasoning. The following literature review 
builds evidence for the hypothesis that both structural-developmental and socialization 
approaches are important to consider in investigating moral reasoning and the processes 
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that underlie moral reasoning. These approaches are blended in the current study. We 
investigate the extent to which structural-developmental characteristics (emotion 
regulation and executive functioning) contribute to moral reasoning as underlying 
processes as well as the extent to which parental socialization (quality of the mother-child 
relationship and parental cognitive support and stimulation) is related to moral reasoning 
both directly and indirectly through the scaffolding of structural-developmental 
characteristics.  
Literature Review 
Although empirical research has established the importance of moral reasoning, 
especially to prosocial behavior (e.g., Carlo, Koller, Eisenberg, Da Silva, & Frohlich, 
1996; Janssens & Dekovic, 1997; Miller, Eisenberg, Fabes, & Shell, 1996), the parent-
child interactions, parental practices and behaviors, and child psychological 
characteristics (other than the emotional responses of empathy and sympathy) that 
contribute to moral reasoning have received relatively little attention, despite theoretical 
arguments for their importance (Hoffman, 2000). Indeed, structural-developmental 
approaches hypothesize that moral reasoning is limited by the maturation of the skills and 
processes that underlie moral reasoning. For example, the ability to down-regulate 
negative emotions like frustration may be important when dealing with others’ desires 
that conflict with one’s own. The planning abilities necessary to think through possible 
outcomes and structure the steps necessary to achieve a desire outcome are also an 
important component of moral reasoning. In both of these examples, a structural-
developmental approach would dictate that these abilities develop over the course of time 
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although, as seen through a socialization approach lens, they are also likely influenced by 
social agents such as parents. 
Socialization approaches hypothesize that moral reasoning is advanced through 
both direct socialization of moral reasoning (e.g., modeling, practice, and subsequent 
internalization) (Bandura & MacDonald, 1963) but also through socialization of the 
abilities that underlie moral reasoning. In other words, parents and other socializing 
forces may not only influence children’s moral reasoning abilities directly, but also 
indirectly by scaffolding and training children to use the basic cognitive and emotional 
abilities that underlie moral reasoning. In the present study structural-developmental and 
socialization approaches are investigated in order to contribute to our understanding of 
how both children’s psychological capacities and parental socialization of those 
psychological capacities are related to moral reasoning. 
 Research into the components of moral reasoning has practical applications. 
Moral reasoning can be an important factor in defining how individuals assess a social 
situation, view their duties to act in a situation, and react to the needs of others. 
Moreover, moral reasoning has been associated with compassionate responding. 
Prosocial responding, in turn, is positively related to children’s peer status, friendships, 
and social competence (Lansford, Putallaz, Grimes, Schiro-Osman, Kupersmidt, & Coie, 
2006; Warden & Mackinnon, 2003; Wojslawowicz Bowker, Rubin, Burgess, Booth-
LaForce, & Rose-Krasnor, 2006). Through understanding moral reasoning we understand 
one avenue to social competence.  
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 The development of moral reasoning is a product of both learning and the 
biological maturation of the abilities necessary for this type of reasoning. The implication 
is that moral reasoning can be taught based on children’s level of psychological 
development; children can receive developmentally appropriate aid in advancing moral 
reasoning and the skills that contribute to it. Additionally, by describing the links 
between parental support and child moral reasoning it may be possible to help parents 
learn to facilitate the growth of moral reasoning in their children. In the present study a 
comprehensive model is proposed that integrates aspects of parental facilitation and 
support, child executive function and emotional regulatory abilities, and the mediational 
pathways by which they are related to children’s moral reasoning.  
 In the proposed model children’s moral reasoning is hypothesized to be related to 
both child and parent factors through mediational pathways. In this model there are two 
main areas of influence on moral reasoning: 1) parental characteristics, including the 
quality of the mother-child relationship and parental support and facilitation of children’s 
basic cognitive abilities, and 2) children’s emotion regulation and executive functioning. 
Parental characteristics are hypothesized to be related to moral reasoning through child 
processes (i.e., the quality of the mother-child relationship and cognitive support and 
stimulation are thought to influence children’s emotion regulation and executive 
functioning which, in turn, are processes directly related to moral reasoning). The 
hypothesized model can be found in Figure 1. In the following pages the literature linking 
these constructs to one another are described in more detail and the conceptual relations 
between them are reviewed. In any mediational hypothesis or model one must usually 
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establish that a) there is a relation between the mediated factor and the outcome; b) there 
is a relation between the mediator and the outcome and; c) the relation between mediated 
factor and the outcome can be explained by the mediator. This literature review follows 
this guideline; given that moral reasoning is the outcome of interest, discussion of the 
constructs proceeds from moral reasoning to distal/mediated factors (parental 
characteristics) to proximal/mediating factors (child characteristics).  
Moral Reasoning  
Theorists have hypothesized that moral reasoning, in particular prosocial moral 
reasoning, is an important catalyst for prosocial behavior (Carlo, Eisenberg, & Knight, 
1992). Ways of moral reasoning become integrated into children’s self concepts and 
motivate prosocial behavior (Hoffman, 2000), although cognitive advances over time are 
expected to change the sophistication of moral reasoning as well (Eisenberg & Shell, 
1986). Consistent with theory, researchers have found positive associations between 
prosocial moral reasoning and prosocial behavior in children (Carlo et al., 1996; Janssens 
& Dekovic, 1997; Miller et al., 1996). The purpose of the current study, however, is to 
delineate more clearly the components of moral reasoning and their relative contributions 
to explaining variance in children’s levels of moral reasoning. 
Middle childhood is an important time to study moral reasoning in children. Both 
Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg (1981) posited that children around the age of 10 are making 
important changes in the way they think about moral situations. During this time 
hedonistic moral reasoning based on benefit to the self is decreasing while other-oriented 
moral reasoning is increasingly common. Supporting this, Eisenberg and colleagues 
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(Eisenberg, Lennon, & Roth, 1983; Eisenberg et al., 1987) found that in middle 
childhood children’s hedonistic reasoning decreases with age and that most other-
oriented types of moral reasoning increase with age, up until adolescence when both 
hedonistic and other-oriented types of moral reasoning both increase.   
Parental Characteristics: Quality of the Mother-Child Relationship 
The quality of the mother-child relationship may be particularly important in 
facilitating the growth of both moral reasoning and emotion regulation. Kochanska, 
Forman, Aksan, and Dunbar (2005) found that the quality of the mother-child 
relationship, termed mutually responsive orientation and characterized by mutual 
responsiveness and shared affect, was positively related to young children’s moral 
cognitions. Prior research by Kochanska and colleagues supports these findings (e.g., 
Kochanska, Forman, & Coy, 1999; Kochanska & Murray, 2000). Similar findings have 
been reported by other researchers; for example, Laible and Thompson (2000) found that 
positive shared affect was related to 4-year-olds’ guilt after misbehavior and resistance to 
temptation in laboratory observations. A limitation in this area of research is the limited 
age range under study; most prior studies have included only pre-K and early school age 
children. 
In responding sensitively and supportively to children’s distress, parents may help 
children to build their emotion regulatory capabilities. Research has established that 
young children who are attached to their parents through consistently warm and 
supportive interactions tend to have good regulatory abilities (for a review see Calkins & 
Hill, 2007). Additionally, there is evidence that emotionally supportive parenting is 
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related to regulation in older children as well; Neitzel and Stright (2003) found that for 
early adolescent children emotional support was positively related to children’s task 
persistence and behavioral control one year later. By offering warmth and support in their 
interactions with their children, parents may engender care-based reasoning in their 
children. Garner (2006) found that aspects of maternal emotional support were positively 
related to both emotion regulation and prosocial behavior in a sample of young African 
American children. Similarly, mothers’ encouragement of emotional expression and 
emotion-focused maternal reactions to children’s negative experiences were positively 
related to comforting and helping in young boys, though this was not true for girls 
(Eisenberg, Fabes, & Murphy, 1996). Davidov and Grusec (2006) found that maternal 
responsiveness to child distress was positively related to children’s regulation of negative 
affect and prosocial behavior.  
One caveat to the research in this area is that warm and supportive parenting is 
often discussed as if it is interchangeable with the quality of the mother-child 
relationship; though the concepts are highly related one is a quality of an individual while 
the other is a quality of a dyadic relationship. Specifically dealing with the quality of the 
mother-child relationship and regulation, Cole, Teti, and Zahn-Waxler (2003) found that 
poor mutual regulation of anger in mother-child dyads was related to young boys’ later 
conduct problems. This finding would seem to be consistent with a socialization 
perspective of moral reasoning; parent-child interactions provide a context for parents to 
scaffold children’s regulatory abilities and the opportunity to teach them strategies for 
dealing with emotions. Though a potentially important link, the relation between the 
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quality of the mother-child relationship and child moral reasoning as mediated by 
children’s emotional regulation has not been examined in the literature. 
Parental Characteristics: Cognitive Support and Stimulation 
Although it is reasonable to think that the cognitive stimulation and support that 
children receive from their parents should be related to moral reasoning there is little 
empirical evidence to support this connection (Carlo, Fabes, Laible, & Kupanoff, 1999). 
In theory, learning opportunities with parents should promote cognitive development in a 
wide array of areas, including the cognitive processes that underlie moral reasoning. In 
one of the few studies relating parental cognitive stimulation and support to moral 
reasoning, Walker and Taylor (1991) conducted an investigation of children’s moral 
reasoning and parental styles of cognitive interaction with their children. They found that 
children’s moral development was positively related to parents’ use of higher level moral 
reasoning during interactions and that parents’ questioning of children’s moral reasoning 
facilitated subsequent higher level reasoning. Similarly, Pratt, Arnold, Pratt, and Diessner 
(1999) found that fathers’ but not mothers’ discussions of moral reasoning with their 
early adolescent children was related to their children’s later moral reasoning.  
Parents’ cognitive scaffolding and support has been shown to be related to 
children’s problem solving and use of cognitive strategies (Neitzel & Stright, 2003) and 
to efforts to actively involve children in problem solving effort (Neitzel & Stright, 2004). 
Consistent with a socialization perspective, it is reasonable to hypothesize that parent-
child interactions guided by the parent with the purpose of teaching children attentional, 
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planning, and reasoning skills should facilitate executive functioning abilities. It would 
be expected that those abilities are also positively related to moral reasoning.   
Child Psychological Characteristics: Emotion Regulation 
 In considering the relation between emotion regulation and moral reasoning, it is 
important to distinguish between children’s temperamental emotionality and the 
behaviors and strategies that are used to regulate that emotionality (Cole, Martin, & 
Dennis, 2004). While studies relating emotion regulation to moral reasoning are scarce, 
aspects of children’s emotionality have been found to be related to prosocial behavior. 
Negative emotionality/lability has been reported to be negatively related to prosocial 
behavior (Eisenberg, Fabes, Karbon, et al., 1996) as has combined negativity and 
reactivity (impulsivity or swiftness in emotional reactions) in conjunction with child 
anger (Diener & Do-Yeong, 2004) and difficult temperament (Blair, Denham, Kochanoff, 
& Whipple, 2004). In the present model, however, it is hypothesized that emotion 
regulation, rather than temperamental reactivity, plays the essential role in children’s 
moral reasoning.  
Emotion regulation has been defined as “the process of initiating, avoiding, 
inhibiting, maintaining, or modulating the occurrence, form, intensity, or duration of 
feeling states, emotion-related physiological, attentional processes, motivational states, 
and/or the behavioral concomitants of emotion in the service of accomplishing affect-
related biological or social adaptation or achieving individual goals” (Eisenberg & 
Spinrad, 2004, p. 338). This definition further refines the definition offered by Cole et al. 
(2004) (emotion as regulated rather than regulating) and describes emotion regulation as 
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a willful (though not necessarily highly conscious), functional, goal-driven process that is 
the sum of its motivational, attentional, and behavioral sub-processes. The prevailing 
theory is that emotion regulation is especially important in promoting prosocial behavior 
when the situation of another is emotionally arousing (Eisenberg, Wentzel, & Harris, 
1998); although different types of regulation have been linked to morally relevant 
behaviors in both children and adults, no research has been conducted that examines the 
links between emotion regulation and moral reasoning (e.g., Eisenberg, 2000).  
In general support of the importance of emotion regulation to moral reasoning, 
children’s arousal regulation has been shown to be related to helping in younger children 
(Fabes, Eisenberg, Karbon, Troyer, & Switzer, 1994; Ungerer, Dolby, Waters, Barnett, 
Kelk, & Lewin, 1990). Given that a positive association between regulation and prosocial 
behavior has been established, it is reasonable to hypothesize that regulation would also 
be positively related to moral reasoning. Attention to another’s emotional arousal may be 
experienced as empathy and a subsequent motivation to help, but too much vicarious 
arousal may result in personal distress and the urge to escape (Eisenberg, 2000). One 
function of emotion regulation is to inhibit overarousal and maintain a degree of 
empathic arousal through attentional (e.g., momentary gaze aversion) or behavioral (e.g., 
self-soothing) processes in the service of a larger goal (helping). For this same reason, 
emotion regulation is proposed to be an important predictor of moral reasoning. More 
sophisticated types of moral reasoning that are other-focused (reasoning not based solely 
on benefit to the self or “give and take” tradeoffs) often have an emotional component. It 
may be that the emotions associated with interpersonal interactions involving conflict, 
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particularly negative emotions such as personal distress, frustration, or jealousy, could 
interfere with cognitive reasoning processes in moral situations; the ability to regulate 
negative emotions may facilitate moral reasoning. Emotion regulation may also play a 
role in maintaining or intensifying emotions such as empathy and sympathy that are 
associated with sophisticated moral reasoning and provide additional impetus for 
prosocial behavior.  
Child Psychological Characteristics: Executive Functioning 
In the current paper, executive functioning is also considered as an important 
child cognitive characteristic that is related to moral reasoning. Currently, there is no 
universally accepted definition of executive functioning. Inhibitory control of prepotent 
responding, working memory, attentional control, cognitive flexibility/rule switching, 
planning, goal monitoring, and error detection and correction are all processes that have 
been defined as important to executive functioning (Engle & Kane, 2004; Espy & 
Kaufmann, 2002; Moses, Carlson, & Sabbagh, 2007; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 
1997). Carlson (2005) offers a simple functional definition of executive function as the 
“higher order, self-regulatory, cognitive processes that aid in the monitoring and control 
of thought and action” (p. 595). Thus, depending on the context, any number of the above 
mentioned processes may comprise executive functioning. In a similar line of thought, 
Stuss and Alexander (2000) argue that there is no unitary executive function but rather 
that executive function is the situation-specific combination of integrated and converging 
cognitive abilities that facilitate control functions.    
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 Executive functioning or aspects of executive functioning may facilitate moral 
reasoning through multiple avenues. Planning may allow children to cognitively work 
through possible outcomes for both parties in a moral dilemma and weigh costs and 
benefits of various actions. Inhibitory control of prepotent responding may allow children 
to create resolutions that are beneficial to both parties rather than focusing solely on self-
benefit. Attentional control may be important in maintaining a focus on situations 
involving moral reasoning and controlling the urge to attend to non-relevant or distracting 
aspects of these situations. Working memory may buttress planning and other aspects of 
executive functioning by allowing faster cognitive processing and may help children to 
keep in mind multiple aspects of a moral dilemma.   
In support of the links between aspects of executive functioning and moral 
reasoning, Dunn and Hughes (2001) found that measures of working memory and 
attention and executive function (the Tower of London) were negatively related to young 
children’s violent pretend play. Kochanska, Murray, and Coy (1997) found that 
children’s inhibitory control was positively related to moral reasoning and some moral 
behaviors (e.g., restraint from cheating in a game). Additionally, aspects of executive 
function have been found to be positively related to prosocial behavior (Eisenberg, Fabes, 
Karbon, Murphy, Wosinski, Polazzi, et al., 1996; Moore, Barresi, & Thompson, 1998).  
Emotion regulation and executive functioning may employ similar processes (e.g., 
attentional control, inhibitory control, self-monitoring and self correction); like Stuss and 
Alexander (2000), I argue that they are both the convergence of integrated processes for 
achieving a goal, though the goals of each may differ (i.e., the regulation of emotion 
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versus the regulation of thought and behavior). It is also argued that the functions of 
emotion regulation and executive functioning are highly similar, though they operate in 
different domains. Emotion regulation involves the processes that inhibit, maintain, and 
modulate affect and affect-based action in the service of a goal whereas executive 
functioning involves the processes that inhibit, maintain, and modulate cognition and 
cognitively-driven action in the service of a goal. Whether or not the processes involved 
in emotion regulation and executive function are physiologically the same or unique for 
cognitive and emotional domains and the extent to which these domains are functionally 
integrated is a topic on the frontier of child development research and speaks to the 
broader question of the integration of cognition and emotion throughout development.  
Bell and Wolfe (2004) have proposed that aspects of cognition and emotion are 
integrated early in life, as early as the first year. Leerkes, Paradise, O’Brien, Calkins, and 
Lange (2008) have hypothesized that cognitive and emotional control begin as distinct 
constructs but become integrated as children mature and learn to employ both types of 
abilities simultaneously to solve problems and navigate social relationships. They found 
that in 3.5-year-old children, latent constructs measuring cognitive control and emotional 
control were positively related to one another but that neither construct was significantly 
related to a measure of preschool academic ability. Of the two types of control, only 
emotional control was negatively related to reports of socio-emotional problems. One 
possible interpretation is that young children’s cognitive and emotional control processes 
employ some of the same basic sub-processes (thus accounting for their interrelation) but 
are not yet integrated in social and academic aspects of children’s lives. Additionally, the 
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expression of emotion regulation and executive function in social contexts in older 
children may be indistinguishable to observers; Buckner, Mezzacappa, and Beardslee 
(2003) found that interviewers’ ratings of emotion regulation and executive function of 
adolescents and children in middle childhood were so highly correlated that they were 
combined into one self-regulatory construct. Other empirical work supports the 
hypothesis that aspects of emotion regulation and executive function are positively 
related, at least for younger children. It is possible that these interrelations can be 
accounted for by shared processes that underlie both emotion regulation and executive 
function. Gerardi-Caulton (2000) found that 2-year-old children’s inhibitory control was 
negatively correlated with ratings of children’s negative emotionality and frustration at 
about -.38.  
Research relating emotion regulation to executive functioning in older children is 
more equivocal. Perez and Gauvain (2005) found that 7-year-old children high in 
emotional intensity performed better on a planning task when they used fewer 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies but no significant main effects or other 
moderated effects were found. In 7- to 10-year-old children, Simonds, Kieras, Reuda, and 
Rothbart (2007) found that executive attention was positively related to emotion 
regulation and socially appropriate emotional expression during a disappointing gift task. 
The current evidence suggests that emotion regulation and executive functioning are 
positively related, possibly because they engage similar underlying processes. Indeed, 
aspects of emotion regulation and executive functioning seem to share at least some of 
the same areas of the brain (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). Analyses in the present study 
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can test hypotheses regarding the interrelations between executive function and emotion 
regulation as well as their contributions to moral reasoning in middle childhood.      
Summary and Hypotheses 
 Research has documented the positive relation between moral reasoning and 
prosocial behavior (e.g., Carlo et al., 1996; Janssens & Dekovic, 1997; Miller et al., 
1996). Less effort has been focused on understanding the child and parental factors 
related to moral reasoning. A comprehensive understanding of these factors and their 
interrelations has the potential to aid in the creation of interventions designed to increase 
prosocial behavior or decrease aggressive behavior. This could be done by teaching 
children to develop the reasoning and regulatory skills that motivate moral reasoning and 
subsequent behavior and by informing parents of the types of support they can give their 
children to scaffold the development of those skills.  
Overall, there are numerous gaps in the literature on the relations between moral 
reasoning, children’s emotion regulation, cognitive executive functioning, the quality of 
the mother-child relationship, and the cognitive support and stimulation offered by 
parents in the home environment. This study will integrate aspects of parental behaviors 
and practices with child psychological characteristics in a mediational model that 
includes aspects from areas of child study that have received little attention or no study at 
all as they relate to moral reasoning. In so doing, a more complete model of children’s 
moral reasoning can be investigated and tested.   
 Though the actual interrelations between parental support, emotion regulation, 
executive function, and moral reasoning may be more complex than hypothesized in this 
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paper, an initial and parsimonious model is proposed in which both emotion regulation 
and executive function are directly and positively related to moral reasoning (see Figure 
1). Further, it is hypothesized that emotion regulation and executive function are 
positively related to each other (e.g., Leerkes et al., 2008). It is thought that parental 
support is positively related to moral reasoning via mediational pathways. Specifically, it 
is hypothesized that parental cognitive stimulation and support is related to moral 
reasoning through the mediator of executive functioning and the quality of the mother-
child relationship is related to moral reasoning through the mediator of emotion 
regulation.
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHODS 
 
 
 
Participants 
 The current study used data from the first cohort of three cohorts of children 
engaged in an ongoing longitudinal study. This cohort was recruited from area child day 
care centers, the County Health Department, and the local Women, Infants, and Children 
program. Potential participants for cohort 1 were recruited at 2 years of age (cohort 1: 
1994-1996) and screened using the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL 2-3; Achenbach, 
1991) completed by the mother in order to over-sample for externalizing behavior 
problems. Children were identified as being at risk for future externalizing behaviors if 
they received an externalizing T-score of 60 or above. Efforts were made to obtain 
approximately equal numbers of males and females. A total of 154 children were 
selected.  
 The sample included in the present report consists of 87 children (49 females, 38 
males), all children who had completed laboratory visits at age 10 and had observational 
data available to be coded. The current study uses data from when participant children 
were age 10 (M = 128.6 months, SD = 3.1). The majority of the sample is White (57%) or 
Black (38%). Eighty-nine percent of mothers had at least some college education and 
50% possess a college degree or higher; 62% of the mothers were married at the time of 
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data collection. Chi-square and t-tests were conducted to determine if the current sample 
differed from the sample at initial recruitment based on demographic characteristics; a 
chi-square test indicated that there was no group differences in participants’ race, χ
2
 (3, N 
= 154) = 5.65, p = .13, and no mean differences in mothers’ levels of education, t (152) = 
1.36, p = .18, or socioeconomic status at age 2, t (152) = 1.27, p = .21. 
Procedure 
 At age 10, children and their mothers participated in two laboratory visits and a 
home observation. Mothers were provided a detailed verbal description of the procedures 
at time of each visit and were asked to read and sign an informed consent form. Children 
and mothers participated in a series of laboratory tasks designed to elicit a variety of 
behaviors of developmental interest. Mother-child interactions were videotaped and later 
coded by trained observers. Mothers also completed questionnaires assessing family 
demographics and their child’s behavior. For the current study, three coded tasks from 
the 10-year laboratory visit and two questionnaires were used and are described below. 
Measures  
 Demographic Information. 
 Demographic measures were completed by mothers; maternal education, child 
sex, and child race were selected for evaluation as possible control variables. 
Moral Reasoning..  
 Children’s moral reasoning was assessed by coding children’s discussions of 
vignettes from videos of mother-child interactions in a laboratory task. Each mother-child 
interaction lasted approximately 10 minutes. In this task mothers and children engaged in 
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a discussion based on a set of six cards given to them by an experimenter. The cards 
contained descriptions of children in morally ambiguous social situations (e.g., a school 
project involving conflicting desires; another child cutting in line to get the last ticket to a 
movie). Moral reasoning task vignettes were taken from the Crick and Dodge (1996) 
social information processing task and the Schultz, Yeates, and Selman (1989) 
Interpersonal Negotiation Strategies Interview. A copy of these vignettes can be found in 
Appendix A. 
The coding scheme used to score moral reasoning was developed by Eisenberg, 
Lennon, and Roth (1983) and has since been used in other studies of moral reasoning 
(Eisenberg et al., 1987; Miller, Eisenberg, Fabes, & Shell, 1996). Children’s discussion 
of each vignette was coded into levels of moral reasoning. The levels of moral reasoning 
are viewed as advancing in cognitive sophistication and understanding of social values 
and are as follows: Level 1, appeal to authority orientation; Level 2, hedonistic, self-
focused orientation; Level 3, needs of others orientation; Level 4, approval and 
interpersonal orientation and stereotyped orientation; Level 5a, self-reflective, empathic 
orientation; Level 5b, transitional level; and Level 6, strongly internalized orientation 
(see Table 1 for further detail on the levels of moral reasoning).  
Each statement that a child made could potentially but not necessarily be given a 
moral reasoning score; only statements that fit into one of the levels of moral reasoning 
were scored. In addition, children’s overall quality of reasoning within each level was 
scored based on how clearly statements fit into a level of moral reasoning; a score of 1 
was given for vague/unclear use of a level, a score of 2 was given for clear use, and a 
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score of 3 was given for repeated clear use. Thus, each child received a score ranging 
from 0 to 3 for each level of moral reasoning in each story. Scores for each level were 
then summed across stories so that each child received a score ranging from 0 to 18 for 
each level of moral reasoning. In cases where children repeated their mothers’ 
suggestions, child responses were coded as 1, vague use of a moral reasoning level; 
simply nodding or saying yes in agreement was scored as 0. 
Following scoring procedures used by Eisenberg et al. (1987), for the purpose of 
analysis, raw scores for each level were then changed to proportions by dividing the raw 
score for each level by the total score (sum of all levels). Weighted moral reasoning 
scores for each level of reasoning were computed by taking the proportion of moral 
reasoning used at each level multiplied by the level of reasoning. In short, this means that 
children’s moral reasoning scores are weighted. A child who responds with more 
sophisticated types of moral reasoning will receive a higher overall score than a child 
who uses less sophisticated reasoning. As an example, if an individual’s reasoning scores 
were such that 50% was at level 3 (needs of others), 25% was at level 5 (expressed 
empathy), and 25% at level 6 (expression of a strongly internalized value); that 
individual’s overall score would be (.50 x 3) + (.25 x 5) + (.25 x 6) for an overall score of 
4.25. The overall score was used for data analysis. Intercoder reliability was established 
by having 20% of the mother/child interactions coded by a second trained coder. 
Weighted kappa values were used to assess reliability for all observational coding. The 
average intraclass correlation coefficient for all levels of moral reasoning was .96, no 
correlation coefficients for individual levels of moral reasoning were below .90. 
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Descriptions of each level of reasoning and common examples of children’s responses 
can be found in Table 1; examples reference Story 2, the project story.  
 Child emotion regulation. 
 Child emotion regulation was assessed through maternal report using the 
Regulation subscale of the Emotion Regulation Checklist (ERC; Shields & Cicchetti, 
1997) which includes 8 items (e.g., “My child can say when he or she is feeling sad, 
angry or mad, fearful or afraid,” “My child is empathic towards others; shows concern 
when others are upset or distressed”) each scored on a 4-point Likert scale. Cronbach’s 
alpha reliability for the emotion regulation subscale in this study was .71.  
 Child executive functioning. 
 Executive functioning was assessed through children’s performance on a task, the 
Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS) Tower Test (Delis, Kaplan, & 
Kramer, 2001), which is primarily designed to assess children’s executive planning 
abilities, though it may tap other aspects of executive function such as visual attention 
and inhibition as well (e.g., Bull, Espy, & Senn, 2004). The D-KEFS Tower Test has 
been normed with a large, nationally representative sample of children and has been 
repeatedly shown to be a valid assessment of executive planning (Delis et al., 2001). In 
this task children are given a wooden board with three pegs of equal height on it. Flat 
doughnut-like discs of different sizes are stacked, largest to smallest, on one peg at the 
end of the board. Children are instructed that the goal is to move all of the discs to 
reproduce a configuration shown to them by the experimenter. They are also instructed 
that they can move only one disc at a time and that they are not allowed to stack a larger 
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disc on top of a smaller one. In this task there are 9 total trials of increasing difficulty; 
achievement scores for each trial are based on whether a participant can complete the 
configuration in the time allotted and in the minimum number of moves required to 
reproduce the configuration. As difficulty increases across trials, higher achievement 
scores are awarded (e.g., on trial 1, 2 points are awarded if the configuration is completed 
in 30 seconds and 1 move; on trial 9 4 points are awarded if the configuration is 
completed in 4 minutes and 26 moves). Achievement scores across all trials were 
summed to assess executive planning ability.   
Dyadic Relationship Quality. 
 The quality of the mother-child relationship was defined by ratings of goal-
directed partnership and affective mutuality and was coded from videos of mother-child 
interactions in two laboratory tasks. Both tasks are intended to be mildly to moderately 
stressful for the dyad. In one task mothers directed their children in completing a puzzle 
which only the child could manipulate but only the mothers could see. Children put their 
hands into holes in a “puzzle box” that obscured their view of the puzzle. Mothers could 
see the puzzle from an unobscured view at the back of the puzzle box (Eisenberg et al., 
2001). In a second task mothers and children were asked to work together to write a 
speech about the child which the child would then give while an experimenter videotaped 
the child.  
Goal-Directed Partnership and Affective Mutuality/Felt Security of the dyad in 
the two laboratory tasks were coded using 7-point rating scales. The coding scheme used 
the NICHD Study of Early Child Care Parent-Child Interaction Scales: Middle Childhood 
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(Owen, Ware, & Barfoot, 2000). High levels of Goal-Directed Partnership were 
characterized by dyadic interactions in which mothers and children cooperated and 
worked as a team and interactions were dominated by neither member, the dyad stayed 
focused on the goal, and the mother and child shared power and took turns leading the 
interaction. High levels of Affective Mutuality were characterized by shared emotion 
(both positive and negative); reciprocal joking, smiling, and eye contact; and high levels 
of emotionally supportive verbal and non-verbal communication. Intercoder reliability 
was established by having 20% of the mother/child interactions coded by a second coder. 
The average intraclass correlation coefficients for goal-directed partnership and affective 
mutuality across both tasks were .76 and .90, respectively. As expected, Goal-Directed 
Partnership and Affective Mutuality were highly related (r = .69, p < .01) and so were 
summed into a single measure indexing the quality of the mother-child relationship. 
Coding instructions and definitions appear in Appendix B. 
Parental cognitive stimulation and support. 
 The cognitive stimulation and support offered by parents was defined by ratings 
of cognitive stimulation and parental support of children’s autonomy and was coded from 
videos of mother-child interactions in the same laboratory tasks in which the quality of 
the mother-child relationship was assessed.  
Cognitive Stimulation and Support of Autonomy were coded using 7-point rating 
scales. The coding scheme used the NICHD Study of Early Child Care Parent-Child 
Interaction Scales: Middle Childhood (Owen, Ware, & Barfoot, 2000). High levels of 
Cognitive Stimulation were characterized by frequent use of examples to explain 
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concepts, introduction of new and relevant information to the task, and encouragement of 
planning and problem solving by the parent. High levels of Support of Autonomy were 
characterized by the parent encouraging the child to be an active participant in the 
interaction, respecting the child’s desire to act independently, and generally being 
supportive of the child’s independent problem solving efforts. Intercoder reliability was 
established by having 20% of the mother/child interactions coded by a second coder. The 
average intraclass correlation coefficients for Cognitive Stimulation and Support of 
Autonomy across both tasks were .75 and .84, respectively. As expected, Cognitive 
Stimulation and Support of Autonomy were highly related (r = .37, p < .01) and so were 
summed into a single measure indexing overall cognitive support and stimulation. Coding 
instructions and definitions appear in Appendix C.  
Data Analytic Strategy 
First, the data were analyzed for patterns of missingness. Second, descriptive and 
correlational analyses for all study variables were conducted. Third, path analyses 
evaluating the hypothesized model and comparative models are tested. Path analysis 
provides a useful tool for evaluating multiple direct and indirect relations simultaneously 
in a hypothesized model. It must be noted, however, that path analysis is also bound by 
the same limitations as ordinary least squares regression; among these are the 
assumptions that variables are measured without error, that error terms are not related, 
and that relations among variables are unidirectional (i.e., causal) (Pedhazur, 1997). As is 
common in developmental and non-experimental research, our analyses violate these 
assumptions.
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
Missing Data 
Four participants were missing measures of emotion regulation and three were 
missing measures of executive functioning. The largest amount of missing data came 
from home observations of cognitive stimulation and support (11 cases). This data was 
missing completely at random (MCAR) when compared to participants not missing data 
at the 10-year data collection for the current analyses; Little’s MCAR test,  χ
2
 (60, N = 
87) = 63.95, p = .34. Because data was MCAR listwise deletion of cases was a viable 
option for dealing with the missing data. Listwise deletion, however, would decrease 
power to detect significant relations; because newer imputation procedures such as 
expectation maximization are appropriate for both MCAR and missing at random data 
(Buhi, Goodson, & Neilands, 2008) this method was selected to maintain the sample size.  
The expectation maximization (EM) method from SPSS was used to impute 
remaining missing data from all available information. The following results were highly 
consistent with results obtained using the default maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
procedures in AMOS, which was expected given that both imputation methods use 
similar procedures. One advantage of imputing missing data is that bootstrapping 
procedures to test the significance of indirect effects are possible; AMOS cannot perform 
bootstrapping procedures with missing data. 
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Preliminary Analyses 
 Means, standard deviations, and ranges for all study variables are presented in 
Table 2. In order to evaluate the need for controlling demographic variables three 
separate analyses of variance were conducted for child sex and moral reasoning, child 
race and moral reasoning, and maternal education and moral reasoning. Moral reasoning 
scores did not differ by either race or sex and so these variables were excluded from 
further analyses; there were significant differences in moral reasoning based on maternal 
education, F (4, 84) = 2.57, p = .04. Because significant differences in moral reasoning 
were based on maternal education it was included as a control variable in all analyses.  
Descriptives of the unweighted moral reasoning scores give a sense of children’s 
levels of reasoning; the most common type of reasoning in this 10-year-old sample was 
hedonistic reasoning (unweighted mean of 4.01, SD = 2.07); 96% of children used 
hedonistic reasoning to some extent. Both authority oriented (unweighted mean of 2.08, 
SD = 2.04) and non-hedonistic/needs of others reasoning (unweighted mean of 1.93, SD 
= 1.49) were very common forms of reasoning as well; 66% of children used authority 
oriented reasoning in some form and 84% of children used some amount of non-
hedonistic/needs of others reasoning. Although higher levels of reasoning were used far 
less commonly, they were used to some extent; 6% of the 10-year-olds in this sample 
used reasoning based on empathy and explicit perspective taking and 11% of children 
based their reasoning (at least some of the time) on the highest level of reasoning, 
strongly internalized values. 
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  Correlations among study variables are presented in Table 3. We found that moral 
reasoning was positively correlated with both child factors (emotion regulation and 
executive functioning) and with the quality of the mother-child relationship. The two 
child factors of emotion regulation and executive functioning were unrelated while the 
two parental factors of cognitive support and quality of mother-child relationship were 
positively related. Many of these associations were reduced, however, when maternal 
education was controlled. 
Substantive Analyses  
 Prior to testing the hypothesized model, a series of path analyses were conducted 
to test the relations among parental, parent-child, and child factors to moral reasoning 
using guidelines suggested by Stage, Carter, and Nora (2004). This series of models was 
intended to build evidence for the hypothesized direct and indirect relations among the 
study variables (i.e., that child factors would mediate the relations between parenting 
characteristics and children’s moral reasoning). The models tested include a direct effects 
model, a “full” model (direct and indirect effects from parenting characteristics), an 
indirect effects model (the hypothesized model), and a child-driven model (child 
characteristics are mediated by parental characteristics). In all models maternal education 
is controlled for though not pictured in the figures. Each model and its results are 
reviewed in detail.  
First, a direct paths model was tested; this is the simplest model positing that both 
parent and child characteristics are directly related only to moral reasoning. With all 
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variables in the model, only executive functioning was significantly related to moral 
reasoning; direct model results are presented in Figure 2.  
 The other tested models all evaluate indirect effects as well as direct effects. 
Bootstrapping procedures provide reliable estimates of indirect relations for small 
samples and the power to detect significant relations that normal procedures may not. As 
noted by Shrout and Bolger (2002), bootstrapping procedures can still be used to test 
indirect relations even when there is no bivariate relation between the X and Y variables 
(e.g., cognitive stimulation and support and its relation to moral reasoning via the 
mediator of executive functioning). Following procedures outlined by Shrout and Bolger 
(2002), AMOS bootstrapping procedures using 2000 samples with replacement were 
used to assess indirect relations in subsequent models. 
 The second model (Figure 3) tested both direct and indirect relations of parental 
characteristics and direct relations of child characteristics to moral reasoning. This “full” 
model was tested as the main comparison model for the hypothesized model in order to 
answer the questions of whether direct relations between parental characteristics are 
needed to predict children’s moral reasoning or if relations between parental 
characteristics and moral reasoning are fully mediated by child characteristics. The 
quality of the mother-child relationship was directly related to children’s emotion 
regulation but not their moral reasoning. Cognitive support and stimulation was not 
directly related to either executive functioning or moral reasoning. In this model only 
children’s executive functioning was directly related to moral reasoning. Table 4 presents 
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results for indirect effects for this model. Bootstrapped results for indirect effects 
indicated that there were no mediated pathways to moral reasoning. 
 The third model tested was the hypothesized model in which parental 
characteristics are indirectly related to moral reasoning via child characteristics. Figure 4 
presents the direct effects among the model variables. The quality of the mother-child 
relationship was positively related to children’s emotion regulation. Cognitive support 
and stimulation, however, was not related to children’s executive functioning. Executive 
functioning was positively related to moral reasoning. Estimates of indirect effects for the 
hypothesized model can be found in Table 5. The quality of the mother-child relationship 
was positively, indirectly related to moral reasoning via the mediator of emotion 
regulation, though the indirect effect was only marginally significant (p = .09). There 
were no other significant or marginally significant mediational pathways to moral 
reasoning. 
 The final model, the child-driven model, assesses the possibility that the relations 
between child characteristics and moral reasoning are mediated by parental 
characteristics (Figure 5). Children’s emotion regulation was directly related to the 
quality of the mother-child relationship but not moral reasoning. Executive functioning 
was directly related to moral reasoning but not parental cognitive support and 
stimulation. Neither the quality of the mother-child relationship nor cognitive support and 
stimulation were directly related to moral reasoning. Finally, there was some evidence 
that emotion regulation may be mediated rather than a mediator; recall that when direct 
effects were included in the models relating parental characteristics to moral reasoning 
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emotion regulation was not a significant direct predictor but was only significant when it 
served as a mediator and no direct effects were included. As Table 6 indicates, testing the 
child-driven model indicated that the quality of the mother-child relationship did not 
mediate the relation between emotion regulation and moral reasoning; emotion regulation 
seems to fit best as a mediator between the quality of the mother-child relationship and 
moral reasoning although, as noted, the mediational effect was marginal. 
In evaluating the overall model we selected several measures of model fit and 
compared our hypothesized model to each of the alternate models. The measures of fit 
include the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Normed Fit Index 
(NFI), and Parsimony-adjusted Normed Fit Index (PNFI) (a version of NFI that applies 
parsimony adjustment in which overly complex models are penalized; higher values 
indicate a better fit) (Mulaik et al., 1989). Comparative models in these analyses included 
the direct effects model (predictor variables directly related only to moral reasoning, a 
full model (each observed parental variable directly related to both child variables and 
moral reasoning), the hypothesized model (parental characteristics are related indirectly 
to moral reasoning via child characteristics), and a child-driven model (child variables 
directly related to moral reasoning via direct and indirect paths through parental 
variables). These comparisons are presented in Table 7. The direct model clearly did not 
fit the observed associations in the data well. The full model also provided a poor fit to 
the data; including both direct and indirect effects from the distal factors of parental 
characteristics did not improve description. The hypothesized and child-driven models 
had the same levels of fit; both had non-significant chi squares and matching RMSEA 
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values. Other indexes of fit were also highly similar; both offered adequate explanatory 
mechanisms for the data (as indicated by RMSEA, CFI, and NFI). The hypothesized 
model, however, explained about twice as much variance as the child-driven model due 
to the direct relation between executive functioning and moral reasoning. Thus, the 
hypothesized model was accepted as the best and simplest representation of the data.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 The purpose of the current study was to delineate the mediational processes by 
which parental and child characteristics are related to moral reasoning for children in 
middle childhood. Specifically, a hypothesized mediational model and comparative 
models were tested to assess whether a) children’s emotion regulation and executive 
functioning are directly related to moral reasoning; b) emotion regulation mediates the 
relation between quality of the mother-child relationship and moral reasoning; and c) 
executive functioning mediates the relation between cognitive support and stimulation 
and moral reasoning. Although maternal education was not hypothesized as part of the 
model it was included as a control because it was correlated with nearly every study 
variable. 
 Several competing models were evaluated in this study: a direct effects model, a 
“full” model (both direct and indirect effects), the hypothesized model (indirect effects 
only from parental characteristics), and a child-driven model (direct effects and indirect 
effects via parental characteristics). The direct effects and full models were discarded 
because they provided poor fits to the observed associations in the data. The full and 
child-driven models provided adequate levels of fit. Although the child-driven and 
hypothesized models provided the same levels of fit, the hypothesized model was 
selected because it explained the most variance in the dependent variable, moral 
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reasoning. Further discussion of the results is focused on the hypothesized model, 
referencing the other models as a comparison when necessary. 
 Regarding the hypothesized positive relation between the child characteristics of 
emotion regulation and executive functioning, no significant association was found. This 
finding is somewhat inconsistent with findings with younger children that the two 
constructs are related (e.g., Leerkes, Paradise, O’Brien, Calkins, & Lange, 2008). One 
possible explanation is that in the current study executive functioning was primarily 
assessed using a measure of planning rather than inhibitory control. It is possible that 
executive planning relies less heavily on the same processes that underlie emotion 
regulation as compared to other executive abilities such as inhibitory control. 
Consistent with prior research findings that emotion regulation is positively 
related to morally related emotions and behaviors (Fabes, Eisenberg, Karbon, Troyer, & 
Switzer, 1994; Spinrad et al., 1999; Ungerer, Dolby, Waters, Barnett, Kelk, and Lewin, 
1990), we found that emotion regulation and moral reasoning were positively related; this 
relation disappeared, however, when maternal education was controlled for. Also 
consistent with other research (e.g., Cole, Teti, & Zahn-Waxler, 2003; Davidov & 
Grusec, 2006; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Murphy, 1996; Garner, 2006), we found that the 
quality of the mother-child relationship was positively related to children’s emotion 
regulation.  
 These findings suggest that a high quality mother-child relationship may facilitate 
children’s emotion regulation skills which, in turn, are related to moral reasoning. In the 
current study high quality mother-child relationships were characterized by shared affect 
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and shared goal-directed task engagement. These types of mother-child interactions may 
provide children with opportunities to learn how to self-regulate via co-regulation. In 
high quality interactions it was frequently observed that mothers would allow their 
children to lead the interactions but would be ready to intervene if the task became too 
distressing and help their children to redirect their efforts or control their negative 
emotions. Shared affect in high quality relationships may also help children to learn 
emotion regulation strategies. During stressful tasks mothers often helped their children 
to find the amusing aspects of the situation rather than focusing on the stressful aspects. 
These emotion regulation strategies may be adopted by children who have high quality 
mother-child relationships.  
 Emotion regulation may facilitate moral reasoning by helping children to up-
regulate positive feelings in social interactions (e.g., feelings of closeness or compassion 
that may stimulate more in depth perspective taking of the other’s situation, thought 
about costs and benefits of selfish action, and consideration of how to plan a mutually 
beneficial outcome). In situations involving self-sacrifice in order to help, down-
regulation of negative emotion may allow children to suppress feelings of annoyance or 
personal distress in order to deal with moral situations more effectively. Additionally, 
emotion regulation may allow children to suppress the urge to satisfy their own desires 
and take the desires of others into account. It is important to note, however, that maternal 
education also plays some role in these relations. In this study maternal education was 
controlled for but it may well be that maternal education is part of the mediated link to 
moral reasoning. For example, higher levels of education are related to knowledge about 
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how to interact successfully with children and form positive relationships, positive 
relationships facilitate the development of children’s emotion regulation, and emotion 
regulation facilitates moral reasoning.  
 Though no research has specifically investigated links between executive 
functioning and moral reasoning, our finding that these two factors are positively linked 
is generally consistent with research finding positive links between executive functioning 
and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg, Fabes, Karbon, et al., 1996; Moore, Barresi, & 
Thompson, 1998) and negative links to violent fantasies and aggressive play with peers 
(Dunn & Hughes, 2001). No research has linked the cognitive support and stimulation 
provided by parents to executive functioning; nevertheless, we were surprised that there 
was no significant association between these two factors. Moral reasoning has clear 
cognitive components to it; it involves the processing of information in social situations, 
perspective taking in order to understand another’s needs and desires, accessing rules and 
beliefs about what is morally right and wrong, formulating possible actions and weighing 
their costs and benefits, and thinking about possible outcomes and repercussions of 
actions. Executive function, especially executive function as measured in this study (i.e., 
planning), likely helps children in these reasoning processes. Children who are good at 
planning can employ those same abilities to help them reason through and plan actions in 
morally ambiguous situations. Inn this study we were not successful in identifying the 
parental characteristics that are positively related to children’s executive functioning. 
 Given the lack of research on moral reasoning, especially the cognitive aspects 
involved in moral reasoning, it is not surprising that prior studies have not investigated 
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mediational processes in regards to the factors involved in the current study. As stated 
earlier, in assessing mediation there are typically three steps that are taken. First, the 
relation between the independent variable and the dependent variable should be 
significant. Second, the relation between the independent variable and the mediator 
should be significant. Third, the relation between the mediator and the dependent variable 
should be significant (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Typically, full mediation is declared when 
the independent variable is no longer a significant predictor when the mediator is 
included; partial mediation could be claimed when the mediator is included but the 
independent variable is still a significant predictor but reduced in strength. By assessing 
mediation with multiple paths, we allowed other relations besides those in a specific 
mediational path to account for the reduced strength between the independent variable 
and the dependent variable. As an example, in the direct effects model only executive 
functioning was a significant predictor of moral reasoning despite significant bivariate 
associations between most of the variables and moral reasoning.  
 Consistent with traditional methods of testing mediation, there were significant 
bivariate associations between the quality of the mother-child relationship and moral 
reasoning and between quality of the relationship and emotion regulation. We found a 
marginally significant indirect effect for the quality of the mother-child relationship on 
moral reasoning via emotion regulation (after controlling for maternal education). Given 
the marginally significant finding, it is likely that the link between the quality of the 
mother-child relationship and moral reasoning is partially mediated by children’s emotion 
regulation. Although the evidence is not causal, this mediated link suggests that the 
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hypothesized relations among the quality of the mother-child relationship, child emotion 
regulation, and moral reasoning are possible; mothers may socialize children’s emotion 
regulation skills which are then used in situations requiring moral reasoning. While it is 
possible to estimate the proportion of an effect that is mediated (the indirect effect 
divided by the total effect) this requires very large sample sizes in order to accurately 
estimate the standard error (MacKinnon, Warsi, & Dwyer, 1995) and was not done in this 
study. We found no other evidence of mediation in the variables used in the current 
study; contrary to hypotheses, parental cognitive stimulation and support was not 
indirectly related to moral reasoning via children’s executive functioning. 
 In summary, the current study used theoretically driven hypotheses derived from 
structural-developmental and socialization theories of moral reasoning together to 
formulate a model in which parental characteristics were indirectly related to moral 
reasoning via child psychological characteristics. In testing the study hypotheses we 
found significant direct relations between children’s moral reasoning and children’s 
executive functioning as well as a marginal indirect relation from the quality of the 
mother-child relationship via emotion regulation. This study used non-overlapping 
methods, primarily observations of mother-child interactions, the home environment, and 
child tasks, which eliminates the potential to find significant relations due to mono-
method bias. To our knowledge, this is the only study to assess mediational pathways 
involving both parental and child characteristics to moral reasoning. In addition to 
positing a mediational model to understand children’s moral reasoning, we tested 
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plausible alternate models as well. Additionally, this study makes a unique contribution 
in that no studies have evaluated the role of executive functioning in moral reasoning.  
 There are limitations to the study, however. First, the sample used in this study 
was relatively small. Second, these results may only be generalizable to children in late 
middle childhood; it is possible that the relations found in this study may not hold for 
children at other developmental stages. It is also possible that the results may not be 
generalizable beyond the context in which moral reasoning was evaluated (reasoning 
involving peer situations). Unexpected suppression effects limit our ability to draw 
conclusions regarding the indirect influences of the cognitive support and stimulation that 
parents provide to children in their home environments.  
Future research in this area could move our base of knowledge forward by 
exploring other mediational models involving both parents and children (i.e., both 
socializing and structural characteristics). Future research should also evaluate these 
mediational processes longitudinally. Additionally, potential moderators should be 
considered within these mediational processes. It may be that the processes that lead to 
moral reasoning may be different in direction or strength based on certain demographic 
characteristics. For example, it is possible that these processes differ by or depend upon 
child sex, family SES, parental education, or other characteristics.  
Finally, it is important that moral reasoning be evaluated in contexts that are both 
immediate and relevant to children (e.g., moral reasoning in situations involving a peer or 
a friend who is present in an interaction). Reasoning in such situations should be 
contrasted with children’s moral reasoning in less immediate contexts, as in the 
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assessment used in the current study. By understanding how children think in morally 
ambiguous situations, the reasoning that they use to formulate their responses, and what 
parental and child psychological characteristics are related to these processes we can 
understand how best to apply this knowledge in the formulation of socially beneficial 
programs and in informing parents on how they can raise morally conscious children.  
 
 
Table 1.  
Detailed Description of the Levels of Moral Reasoning and Examples. 
1 Appeal to 
authority 
The individual is concerned with 
self-oriented consequences rather 
than moral considerations. Rather 
than deciding on an action the 
individual defers to authority in 
situations or appeals to an authority 
figure to resolve situations and 
conflicts. 
Preschoolers and younger 
elementary school children 
“I would tell the teacher and 
she would tell them that we 
should do my idea.” 
2 Hedonistic, self-
focused 
The individual is concerned with 
self-oriented consequences rather 
than moral considerations. Reasons 
for assisting or not assisting another 
include consideration of direct gain 
to self, future reciprocity, and 
concern for others who the 
individual needs and/or likes (due to 
the affectional tie). 
Preschoolers and younger 
elementary school children 
 
“I would do my idea for 
looking at the animals.” 
3 Needs of others/ 
non-hedonistic 
The individual expresses concern for 
the physical, material; and 
psychological needs of others even 
though the other's needs conflict with 
one's own needs. This concern is 
expressed in the simplest terms, 
without clear evidence of self-
reflective role taking, verbal 
expressions of sympathy, or 
reference to internalized affect such 
as guilt. 
Preschoolers and 
elementary school children 
 
“We could do the project 
about the animals that live 
in the jungle.” 
4
6
 
 
 
4 Approval and 
interpersonal 
and/or stereotyped 
Stereotyped images of good and bad 
persons and behaviors and/or 
considerations of others' approval 
and acceptance are used in justifying 
prosocial or nonhelping behaviors. 
Elementary and high school 
students 
 
“My teacher would think it 
was nice if we did the 
project by sharing.” 
5 a Empathic 
b Transitional 
(empathic and 
internalized) 
a) The individual's judgments 
include evidence of sympathetic 
responding, self-reflective role 
taking, concern with the other's 
humanness, and/or guilt or positive 
affect related to the consequences of 
one's actions. 
b) Justifications for helping or not 
helping involve internalized values, 
norms, duties, or responsibilities, or 
refer to the necessity of protecting 
the rights and dignity of other 
persons; these ideas, however, are 
not clearly stated. 
Older elementary school 
and high school students 
 
 
 
 
 
Minority of people high 
school age 
 
“I would be disappointed if 
I had to do a project about 
something I didn’t like so I 
think it would be good if we 
could talk about how we 
could work together.” 
6 Strongly 
internalized 
Justifications for helping or not 
helping are based on internalized 
values, norms, or responsibilities, the 
desire to maintain individual and 
societal contractual obligations, and 
the belief in the dignity, rights, and 
equality of all individuals. Positive 
or negative affect related to the 
maintenance of self-respect for living 
up to one's own values and accepted 
norms also characterizes this stage. 
Only a small minority of 
high school students and 
virtually no elementary 
school children 
“It’s not right to make 
someone do what you want 
them to do. I would feel 
bad. I think we should both 
have a part of the project 
that is interesting.” 
4
7
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Table 2.  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges for Study Variables. 
 
Variable Mean SD Range 
Moral 
Reasoning 
2.08 .44 1 – 4.11 
Emotion 
Regulation 
3.34 .39 2.25 – 4 
Executive 
Functioning 
10.62 2.49 3 – 16 
Mother-child 
Relationship 
10.08 1.22 6 – 13.5 
Cognitive 
support 
9.94 1.08 6 – 12 
 
Table 3.  
Correlations for Study Variables. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Moral Reasoning 
 
-     
2. Emotion     
    Regulation 
 
.24* (.17) -    
3. Executive    
    Functioning 
.22* (.23*) .05 (.05) -   
4. Mother-child  
    Relationship 
.22* (.12) .44* (.35*) -.09 (-.10) -  
5. Cognitive  
    support 
.16 (.07) .17 (.04) .09 (.09) .62* (.54*) - 
* denotes p < .05. Partial correlations controlling for maternal education are given in 
parentheses.
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Table 4. 
Indirect Effects for the Full (Direct and Indirect Paths) Model. 
 
  
 Bootstrap bias corrected estimates 
 B SE 95% CI p 
Mother-child 
relationship – Moral 
reasoning 
 
.016 .017 -.008, .053 .284 
Cognitive support – 
Moral reasoning 
 
.008 .019 -.013, .045 .449 
 
Table 5. 
Indirect Effects for the Hypothesized Model. 
 
  
 Bootstrap bias corrected estimates 
 B SE 95% CI p 
Mother-child 
relationship – Moral 
reasoning 
 
.021 .015 .000, -.012 .089 
Cognitive support – 
Moral reasoning 
 
.007 .016 -.242, .042 .442 
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Table 6. 
Indirect Effects for the Child-Driven Model. 
 
  
 Bootstrap bias corrected estimates 
 B SE 95% CI p 
Emotion regulation – 
Moral reasoning 
 
.041 .038 -.021, .104 .242 
Executive functioning – 
Moral reasoning 
 
.001 .004 -.005, .009 .873 
 
 
Table 7. 
Comparison of Hypothesized and Alternate Models. 
 Chi square df p RMSEA NFI PNFI 
Direct 19.23 6 <.01 .16 .83 .33 
Full 7.47 4 .11 .10 .93 .25 
Hypothesized 8.23 6 .22 .07 .93 .37 
Child-driven 8.23 6 .22 .07 .93 .37 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized relations among the study variables.  
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Figure 2. Path model of relations among study variables for the direct model. * denotes p < .05. Unstandardized coefficients 
are given in parentheses. 
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Figure 3. Path model of relations among study variables for the full model. * denotes p < .05. Unstandardized coefficients are 
given in parentheses. 
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Figure 4. Path model of relations among study variables for the hypothesized model. * denotes p < .05. Unstandardized 
coefficients are given in parentheses. 
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Figure 5. Path model of relations among study variables for the child-driven model. * denotes p < .05. Unstandardized 
coefficients are given in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX A 
MORAL REASONING VIGNETTES 
Vignette 1: Christopher/Christina is at lunch at school one day looking for a place 
to sit. He/she sees kids he/she knows at a table across the room. The kids are laughing 
and talking to each other and they look like they are having a good time. Chris goes over 
to their table, sits down, and says “hi” to everyone. The kids look right at him/her, roll 
their eyes, and don’t say anything to him/her. After a few seconds, the kids start talking 
to each other, but no one talks to Chris at all. What should Chris do? 
Vignette 2: Bob/Debbie and Steve/Anne are classmates. They don’t know each 
other very well, but their teacher has assigned them to work together on a social studies 
project about Africa, and they are trying to decide on a topic. Bob/Debbie wants to do the 
report on wild animals, but Steve/Anne wants the report to be about the different areas of 
Africa, like the desert and jungle. What should Bob/Debbie and Steve/Anne do? 
Vignette 3: Andy/Andrea is standing in the hallway one morning before school. 
As he/she is standing there, two kids from his/her class walk by. Although they are 
whispering, Andy/Andrea overhears them say something mean about him/her to each 
other. As they walk by, the two kids look at Andy/Andrea and then laugh as they walk 
down the hall. What should Andy/Andrea do? 
Vignette 4: One day a new kid in class named Don/Denise says he’s/she’s cold 
and asks Jeff/Peggy to lend him/her a sweatshirt that Jeff/Peggy has but isn’t wearing. 
The next day when Don/Denise returns the sweatshirt there’s a hole in it that Jeff/Peggy 
is sure wasn’t there the day before. What should Jeff/Peggy do? 
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Vignette 5: At the movie theater one day, Allen/Amanda wants to buy a ticket for 
a new movie he/she really wants to see. He/she knows there aren’t many seats left for the 
show he/she wants to go to. Just as he/she gets into the line, a bigger kid that 
Allen/Amanda knows from school, says, “I want this spot.” Then the kid cuts into line in 
front of Allen/Amanda. The bigger kid gets the last ticket to see the movie that 
Allen/Amanda wanted to see. What should Allen/Amanda do? 
Vignette 6: Jimmy’s/Bonnie’s class has a substitute teacher named Mr. Jones for 
the day. Jimmy/Bonnie is working on some difficult math problems that he/she is 
supposed to finish before lunch. He/She needs some help from Mr. Jones, but Mr. Jones 
is very busy with other kids in the class. What should Jimmy/Bonnie do? 
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APPENDIX B 
MOTHER-CHILD RELATIONSHIP CODING 
Goal-Directed Partnership 
 This scale measures the extent to which the dyad evolves and shares a common 
goal which has the underlying purposes of providing self esteem enhancing and learning 
experiences for the child. One of the overriding tasks is for the rater to keep in mind if 
there is a goal present and if the goal is adaptive. Essential to this scale is the sense that 
both members are working together, are engaged, and their behavior is interdependent. At 
the high end of this scale the behavior of the dyad is organized throughout with lots of 
positive feedback loops. At the low end of the scale we see disengagement or disparity in 
involvement. 
7. Very High. Parent calibrating his/her behavior to the child, lots of reciprocal 
verbal or non-verbal communication, parent making encouraging statements, parent 
expecting the child to perform the task, child expecting assistance as needed from the 
parent, a stable goal that changes one at a maximum in response to child frustration or 
success, active problem solving behaviors and communication, some conflict or 
frustration is fine. The child is attentive to the parent and the there is a high degree of 
cooperation and engagement. Behavior is highly interdependent between the two for a 
solid partnership. 
1. Very Low. These dyads are maladaptive. There is noticeable confusion, child 
may appear to take control of the interaction or look passive. Parent may look very 
disinterested and passive even if the child looks involved. There is often a one-sidedness 
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to the interaction, stress makes organization fall apart and not return. Negative feedback 
loops are common, frequent task changes without resolution or feedback on previous 
ones. As goals change they become very distal to original. There may be a “you do yours, 
I’ll do mine” type of disengagement. There is no sense of partnership or working 
together. 
Affective Mutuality 
 This scale assesses availability and mutuality of emotion between the child and 
parent and how secure the child feels with the parent. There is an emphasis on the child 
having a sense that the parent has his/her own best interests in mind. There is also an 
emphasis on verbal and non-verbal communication, what the parent and child 
communicate and how they do it. Open and free communication will be marked by 
emotion exchanged and a sense of personal involvement and engagement. The child 
appears free to express positive or negative emotions or feelings. Availability of affect is 
also marked by the parent’s tone of voice communicating warmth and regard for the 
child. At the low end, closed communication or lack of mutuality will be reflected in 
interaction that is stifled or non-reciprocal. At the low end there may be a veneer of 
intimacy or mutuality covering an impoverished experience; emotional experience of the 
parent may be quite different from the experience of the child. The rater must be alert to 
exchange of emotion and the subtle cues that reflect this. Essentially we are interested in 
behaviors which reflect on intimacy in the dyad.. Dyads high on this scale almost always 
have a moment of shared emotion that is pleasurable. At the low end we see stifling of 
emotion, dampening behaviors which avoid or negate expression of emotion, or lots of 
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conflict between the parent and the child. The rater will need to distinguish between 
affect that is muted because of parent’s focus on task (but which still regards child’s 
feelings) and that which has as its purpose to stifle expression. 
7. Very High. There is a sense that experiences (both positive and negative) are 
shared, that the parent shows a response to the child’s emotion and vice versa. Smiling 
back and forth takes place. Eye contact occurs when the child or parent seeks it. There 
may be personal exchanges such that the child uses “I” statement to talk about feelings. 
First person pronouns are used. There may also be physical proximity seeking behaviors, 
help seeking, or some reflection on the experience with the activities (e.g., “this is hard” 
or “this is silly”), that are responded to in a fashion that supports the mutuality observed 
in the dyad. There are almost no “dampening” behaviors by either partner, so that 
emotion and communication flows freely. There is at least one sustained bout of 
reciprocally communicated, positive emotion shared by the partners. 
1. Very Low. There are three possibilities.(1) the dyad appears disengaged or can 
only engage around positive experiences and there is an almost staged like quality to 
those; (2) there is underlying conflict or ambivalence apparent (parent may make it clear 
he or she would rather be somewhere else); or (3) parent and child have very little 
coordinated emotion and appear emotionally disconnected with each other. Parent or 
child may express a positive emotion that is not coordinated with behavior and the other 
one responds. There may be underlying tension in the interaction. Parent may be 
threatened by any negative emotion. Dampening statements may not even be common 
since this dyad may essentially be disengaged around emotion. There is very little 
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attention to each other in terms of warmth or personal involvement. One may also see a 
parent giving derogatory glances at the child, directly or indirectly communicating 
displeasure with the child and/or his/her performance. There is often a veneer of intimacy 
or a staged-like interaction masking an impoverished experience for the parent and child. 
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APPENDIX C 
COGNITIVE SUPPORT CODING 
Cognitive Stimulation 
This scale measures the degree to which the parent tries to foster his/her child’s 
cognitive and mental development. A stimulating parent may take advantage of any 
activity to stimulate development. He/she will instruct the child and/or engage the child 
in a variety of explicit activities with the intent to facilitate learning, development and 
achievement. 
Highly stimulating parents use analogies, explain concepts, encourage 
autonomous problem-solving, and expand on or use the context to teach certain concepts 
and to illustrate ideas. Behaviors include: (a) suggesting or encouraging more 
sophisticated problem-solving strategies (e.g., “What aspects of the errand list will 
influence the order in which we take care of the errands?”) (b) pointing out or asking the 
child about exceptions to the more obvious “black-and-white” approaches to certain rules 
or issues (e.g., “So you think it’s never okay to tattle, but I wonder if there are any 
situations in which it would be okay.”), (c) encouraging high-level planfulness or 
consequential thinking in the child, and (d) encouraging the child to generate more than 
one effective solution to problems (e.g., “You put that card at the end of the sequence. Do 
you think it could go anywhere else?” or “What would be another route we could take 
and still get these three errands done?”), (e) teaching or encouraging perspective-taking 
skills or other sophisticated social skills (e.g., “What do you think that would be like for 
me if you got into trouble at school and I didn’t know about it?”), and (f) applying the 
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tasks or materials to concepts that the child may be currently learning at school (e.g., “So 
there are three stories and six cards per story; how would you figure out how many cards 
there are without simply counting each one?” or “You’re learning about communities in 
school right? Well, what other buildings might you find on a town map that aren’t 
included on this one?”) 
 7. Very High. Parent provides cognitive stimulation that clearly seeks to stimulate 
a higher level of mastery, understanding, or sophistication and does so several times, 
indicating that he or she is taking advantage of this activity as a learning experience for 
the child. 
 1. Very Low. Parent provides no cognitive stimulation. The parent makes no 
attempt to stimulate or teach the child anything. He/she either is totally uninvolved or 
fails to provide any information about the activities or situation. 
Support of Child’s Autonomy 
This scale reflects the degree to which the parent acted in a way that recognizes 
and respects the validity of the child’s individuality, motives, and perspectives in the 
session. A parent scoring low in this scale would be very intrusive in his/her interventions 
with the child exerting his/her expectations on the child in a way that makes the child a 
satellite or servant of the parent rather than a partner in a mutually negotiated 
relationship; or the parent might implicitly define his/her interactions in terms of a win-
lose power struggle in which compliance by the child makes the parent the winner and 
the child submissive.  
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Parents may intrude either harshly or with affection; in either case, his/her actions 
do not acknowledge the child’s intentions as real or valid and communicate that it is 
better and safer to depend on him/her for direction than to attempt individuality. In 
contrast, a parent scoring high on this scale acknowledges the child’s perspectives and 
opinions about the different family rules and ideas for the errand planning task as a valid 
part of the child’s individual identity. A parent scoring very high does this explicitly by 
negotiating rules with the child, verbalizing his/her acknowledgment of the child’s 
intentions and ideas, does not deny the child’s right to those desires, and models his/her 
individuality, too. Note: Parent can get a low score just by denying the child’s 
individuality strongly (e.g. interrupting the child, doing things before the child can on 
his/her own, not allowing child to express his/her own opinion) even though it is not 
interrupting the child’s behavior. 
 7. Very High. Parent very clearly interacts with the child in a way that 
acknowledges the validity of the child’s perspective, encourages the child to 
acknowledge his/her intentions and opinions, and to negotiate the course of interactions 
in the session. This parent also models his/her individuality to the child in these 
negotiated interactions and may insist on the importance of his/her interventions being 
followed, but he/she does so while acknowledging the reality and validity of the child’s 
differing perspective and never in an intrusive manner. 
 1. Very Low. Parent completely denies the child’s individuality in the techniques 
he/she uses. Parent is very intrusive, physical and forceful in controlling the child. 
